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Abstract: 
This paper investigates factors determining participation and effort in illegal hunting, using 
cross-section survey data from households in western Serengeti, Tanzania. One purpose of the 
analysis is to study the impact on illegal hunting of the integrated conservation and 
development project established in this area, namely the Serengeti Regional Conservation 
Project (SRCP). The paper also investigates how the pattern of crop production in agriculture, 
market accessibility and wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals affect illegal 
hunting. The empirical results suggest that effort in illegal hunting is inversely related to 
participation in SRCP. The results also show that the likelihood of illegal hunting is a 
decreasing function of the amount of agricultural land cultivated for maize production. 
Further, the hunting effort is negatively related to the size of cotton- and maize land, as well 
as wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals. 
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1. Introduction 
Protected areas – such as national parks and game reserves – have long been regarded as 
crucial in wildlife conservation. However, the establishment of protected areas has often 
excluded local people from the use of these areas and, during the past decades, this kind of 
exclusionary protected area management has been viewed as having failed to preserve 
wildlife in developing countries (Kiss 1990, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson and Marks 
1995). Today there is a growing recognition that the successful management of protected 
areas depends on the co-operation and support of the local people living with wildlife. In 
response to this, Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), aiming at 
changing rural inhabitants’ incentives to exploit the resources of protected areas through 
benefit-sharing schemes and awareness building, are frequently adopted. The benefit-sharing 
component might include direct utilization of wildlife and income transfers from the tourism 
sector, as ways of compensating the local people for restricted access to the protected area. If 
substitutes are not available or inconsistent with the conservation objective, ICDPs could 
provide alternatives that attempt to, for example, improve access to agricultural markets and 
increase agricultural incomes (Wells and Brandon 1992). The perception in most projects is 
that the local people will switch from illegal hunting to legal (agricultural) activities if the 
latter generate greater revenue. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on illegal hunting of an ICDP 
based on direct utilization of wildlife. In addition, the analysis focuses on the relationship 
between illegal hunting and agricultural conditions such as land use, types of crops, market 
accessibility and wildlife-induced damage to agricultural output. In order to do this, the paper 
uses cross-sectional survey data from households in western Serengeti, Tanzania. The survey 
was conducted in the period June to August 2001 among local communities along the western 
border of the Serengeti National Park. This area has experienced a rapid growth in human 
settlement (Campbell and Hofer 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998) that coincides with a marked 
increase in the number of poachers arrested in the park (Arcese et al. 1995). Today Serengeti 
National Park and its surrounding game reserves contain the world’s largest ungulate herds 
(Sinclair and Arcese 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998), but Sinclair (1995, page 24) states “the 
illegal killing of the migrant ungulates by poachers is potentially the most serious threat to the 
Serengeti ecosystem”. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical reasoning for 
the hypotheses on illegal hunting. The data set is presented in Section 3, while the empirical 
specification and the estimation results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains 
a summary and discussion of the main findings in the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
ICDPs have recently been the focus of attention because of the untested assumptions behind 
their strategies. In the theoretical bio-economic literature, Barrett and Arcese (1998) reveal 
possible undesirable effects of free distribution of game meat to the local people using 
wildebeest exploitation in the western Serengeti as an example. They investigate the impact of 
this strategy on illegal hunting in a household model with no market for game meat, and 
where the household derives utility from consumption of game meat, agricultural output and 
leisure. They show that the household will respond to distribution of game meat by 
substituting legal meat for illegal meat. Consequently, this strategy reduces illegal hunting1. 
See also Johannesen (2004). 
 
The existing ICDP in Serengeti – the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) – is 
based on game meat distribution to the local people (SRCS 1993, SRCS 1995, Rugumayo 
1999). The main purpose of the present analysis is to investigate any differences in illegal 
hunting between households who participate in SRCP and households outside of the project. 
Based on Barrett and Arcese (1998) it is expected that illegal hunting falls with the amount of 
meat from SRCP. In addition, in order to capture other strategies of SRCP, such as awareness 
building and education of game scouts, the analysis investigates whether participation in the 
project in general has a negative impact on illegal hunting. 
 
In order to promote wildlife conservation there have been repeated proposals to implement 
policies that improve economic conditions in the agricultural sector. For instance, Brown et 
al. (1993) suggest that improved labour productivity in agriculture will divert labour away 
from hunting and, thereby, reduce the pressure on wildlife. This relationship is also derived 
from e.g. Smith (1975) and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) in standard hunter-agrarian 
                                                 
1 However, because game meat is considered a normal good, free distribution enhances the total demand for meat. 
Hence, the model implies that game meat distribution increases the aggregate offtake and, consequently, reduces the 
degree of wildlife conservation.  
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household models where the household diverts labour between wildlife harvesting and 
agricultural crop production. In these models, an exogenous increase in cultivated land might 
increase the productivity of labour in agriculture and, consequently, shift the allocation of 
labour towards agricultural production. Based on these results it is expected that an increase in 
cultivated land will reduce illegal hunting. In the same way, in the case of domestic animal 
keeping, a larger herd is also expected to reduce illegal hunting. 
 
Another important feature that may affect illegal hunting is that wildlife roaming outside 
protected areas damages agricultural output. Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) demonstrate that 
increased damage reduces the marginal benefit of labour in agriculture and, thus, more effort 
will be allocated to hunting. Another aim of the present analysis is therefore to investigate 
whether more extensive damage to crops and domestic animals increases illegal hunting. For 
other references on wildlife-induced damage, see e.g. Huffaker et al. (1992), Carlson and 
Wetzstein (1993), Bulte and van Kooten (1996), Schulz and Skonhoft (1996), Skonhoft 
(1999), and Zivin et al. (2000). 
 
Marketing opportunities tend to be limited in regions surrounding protected areas due to 
remote location and lack of good roads and infrastructure. Agricultural output is therefore 
more likely to be selected for subsistence use rather than for sale in small towns or other 
regional markets. In order to increase local incomes, several existing ICDPs attempt to 
improve market accessibility through, e.g., road construction and the promotion of marketing 
associations (Brandon and Wells 1992). However, Brandon and Wells (1992) question the 
underlying assumption that increased income reduces illegal hunting. They claim that this 
understanding is based on an implicit assumption of a fixed income need and that illegal 
hunting stops once this need is covered. Instead, they assert that local people are unlikely to 
switch from illegal hunting to legal activities unless the latter generate more income and fit 
into an overall strategy of utility maximization. The present analysis attempts to investigate 
whether there is less illegal hunting among households who participate in, or have greater 
access to, agricultural markets, than households who do not. 
 
Finally, and in line with the standard result of hunter-agrarian models, the analysis 
investigates whether an increase in the size of a household increases illegal hunting. 
 
3. Data collection and descriptive analysis 
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3.1. Data collection 
The empirical analysis of illegal hunting is based on survey data from the Serengeti and 
Bunda Districts along the western border of the Serengeti National Park. The survey was 
conducted in six villages, equally divided between the districts, and counts 297 households. 
166 and 131 households are from Bunda and Serengeti, respectively. Four of the villages, or 
148 households, participate in the SRCP while, as confirmed by the village executive 
secretaries, no village project exists for the remaining two villages, or 149 households. For a 
further description of the survey, see Appendix 2. 
 
All hunting reported in the survey is illegal and one main purpose of the empirical analysis is 
to investigate the impact of the SRCP on this activity. The project was implemented in 
1993/94 and includes fourteen villages spread evenly between Serengeti and Bunda Districts. 
The SRCP’s strategy to select project villages has not been based on thorough studies of 
illegal activities, but rather on their location in relation to the western border of Serengeti 
National Park. All of the project villages are located along this border, but at some distance 
from the border2. The SRCP distributes game meat to the project villages from a harvesting 
quota set equal to each village by the government, i.e. the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism. The responsibility of the SRCP is to organize hunting and bring the meat to the 
respective villages. The villagers buy the meat at a price set by agreement between the SRCP 
and the village authorities and below the price of illegal meat. 
 
In addition to game meat distribution, the SRCP has assisted the establishment of village-level 
institutions responsible for managing the fund from the hunting quota revenues. These funds 
finance village projects such as schools and dispensaries. The SRCP is also responsible for 
the set-up and training of game scouts in the project villages. Finally, the SRCP works with 
awareness-building in order to improve the relationship between the local people and the 
park. This includes public meetings at village level, seminars and training courses on wildlife 
utilization and management, and other wildlife tasks. For a broader overview of the activities 
of the SRCP, see Rugumayo (1999). 
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis and the sample 
                                                 
2 The SRCP intends to involve the project villages in the future management of the outer areas located between the 
villages and the park border. 
  
6
 
The households were asked about their participation in illegal hunting, hunting trips, and 
targeted species. The reported species are wildebeest, zebra, gazelle, topi, and impala. In 
Table 1, 80 households, or 27 per cent of the sample, report that some household members are 
involved in illegal hunting. The participation rate differs between sub-groups of the sample. 
For instance, 32 per cent of the SRCP households participate in illegal hunting, while this is 
the case for only 22 per cent of households outside the SRCP. Hence, despite the advantages 
of living in a project village, participation in illegal hunting is more widespread in the SRCP 
villages. This demonstrates the need for further investigation of the relationship between 
illegal hunting and participation in the SRCP. The participation rate also varies between 
districts, 22 per cent in Bunda District and 34 per cent in Serengeti District. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As demonstrated in Table 2, the hunters can be divided into two groups. This division is also 
important for the empirical specification of the model in Section 4. The first group of hunters 
(55 per cent of the hunters) report that they go on hunting trips, while the second group (45 
per cent) does not go on hunting trips. Here, hunting trips are defined as trips that last for 
several days and where the hunters usually hunt within the protected area. The hunters who do 
not go on hunting trips hunt closer to their homes and within the village area. They hunt 
during the annual wildebeest migration when wildebeest enter village land during the dry 
season. See Sinclair and Arcese (1995) for a description of the wildebeest migration. Several 
of these households report that they kill wildebeest when they coincidentally enter their 
agricultural field or yard. This indicates that hunting in the home area is less time consuming 
than going on hunting trips. 
 
While the hunting grounds differ between these groups, the targeted species are the same; 
wildebeest is the major species, followed by gazelle, zebra and topi. In addition, both groups 
report that they hunt both as a source of income and for domestic consumption. However, the 
groups differ when it comes to the reported income from illegal hunting. Ninety six per cent 
of households who go on hunting trips earn income from this activity, while this only applies 
to 33 per cent of those who hunt in their home area (not shown in a table)3. One plausible 
                                                 
3 The two groups of hunters identified in this survey must not be confused with the ‘subsistence’ poachers from the 
local community and ‘organized’ and professional poachers from outside as defined by Leader-Williams and Milner-
Gulland (1993). In this survey, all hunters come from the local community, they all use traditional hunting methods 
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explanation of the observed differences in income is that the average offtake is considerably 
higher among households who go on hunting trips (13.86± 30.39 animals), compared to 
hunting in the home area (2.25± 1.99 animals). 
 
The fraction of hunters reporting a positive number of hunting trips differs between sub-
groups of the sample. For instance, 43 per cent of the hunters in the SRCP villages go on 
hunting trips, while the same rate for hunters outside the SRCP is 73 per cent. The 
participation rates differ even more between the districts: 86 per cent of the hunters in Bunda 
go on hunting trips, while only 30 per cent of the hunters in Serengeti report the same. 
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
In agricultural production, these households produce seven main crops: cotton, maize, millet, 
sorghum, cassava, potatoes and beans. Cotton is the only cash crop and is only produced for 
sale. The food crops are, on the other hand, mainly produced for household consumption, or 
for both consumption and sale. As seen in Table 3, crop production is the major income-
generating activity. However, the proportion of households earning income from the 
respective activities differs between the districts. More households earn income from crop 
production in Bunda (86 per cent) than in Serengeti District (60 per cent), which may be 
explained by variation in the crop composition between districts. Seventy three per cent of the 
Bunda farmers grow cotton, while the same number in Serengeti is 6 per cent. Eighty six per 
cent of the farmers in Serengeti grow maize, compared to 54 per cent in Bunda. Further, a 
significantly higher proportion of Serengeti farmers produce maize for sale compared to 
Bunda farmers4. However, this is not enough to offset the income advantage of cotton 
production in Bunda. 
 
The remaining crops in the study area are mainly grown for own-household consumption. 
Millet is the major crop in this group, and is produced by 63 per cent of households. In 
                                                                                                                                                        
(i.e. wire snares, pitfalls, traps, knives, machetes etc. (see Arcese et al. 1995) and they all hunt for meat (for domestic 
consumption or for sale). In line with the terminology used by Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland, both groups are 
therefore subsistence hunters. 
4 The Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between the districts. Interested readers may 
contact the author for this result and Kruskal-Wallis tests on differences in mean income below. 
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contrast to the cotton and maize producers, the millet producers are evenly distributed 
between districts. 
 
Domestic animal keeping, the second major income-generating activity, covers cattle, goats, 
sheep and poultry. Table 3 shows that the rate of households with positive income from this 
activity is higher in Serengeti than in Bunda. Finally, 110 households earn income from non-
agricultural activities. These include selling fish, charcoal, local brew, running small shops 
etc5. Again, the rate of participation differs between the districts, 40 per cent in Bunda and 33 
per cent in Serengeti. However, testing for differences in mean income from non-agricultural 
activities shows it is significantly higher in Serengeti. When it comes to reported income from 
crop production and animal keeping, the data set reveals statistically significant differences in 
mean income in favour of the district with the highest participation rate. However, there is no 
significant difference in the mean total income between the districts. Hence, while the districts 
differ in type of income generating activities, there is no significant difference in mean 
income. 
 
 Table 3 about here 
 
The proportion of households earning income from crops and/or domestic animals is lower in 
SRCP villages than in non-SRCP villages, while the proportion of households earning income 
from non-agricultural activities is higher in SRCP villages. Mean total income is significantly 
higher outside SRCP villages. 
 
Wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals is reported by households to be 
caused by elephant, baboon and bushpig, while damage to domestic animals is caused by 
hyenas (livestock), eagles (poultry) and mongooses (poultry). Households were also asked to 
indicate the damage level as ‘no damage’, ‘very little’, ‘much’ or ‘very much’. The second 
row in Table 4 shows that some 86 per cent of respondents complained that wildlife causes 
‘much’ or ‘very much’ damage to crops. This number seems high, and a further investigation 
of the reported damage percentage shows a considerable variation within each response 
category. However, the survey reveals that the mean damage percentage increases between 
                                                 
5 The complete list of ‘other’ activities also includes selling water, honey, and fruit, house rent, carpentry, making 
spears, and employment (teaching or other work at school, wildlife management, village secretary, other employment). 
Only 8 respondents in the sample households (less than 3 per cent) report that they have formal employment. 
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the categories and the means differ significantly. Still, there are some serious measurement 
problems regarding reported measures of crop damage. One problem is that respondents may 
overestimate both damage impression and percentage in the hope for future compensation. A 
second and equally important problem is that the respondents found it difficult to estimate the 
percentage crop damage. Instead, they reported the approximate number of acres damaged as 
a percentage of the number of acres cultivated. It is therefore important to note that this 
measure reflects neither the exact share of output damaged, nor the value of the loss. 
 
 Table 4 about here 
 
As seen in the fifth row of Table 4, far more households report that they experience ‘no 
damage’ to domestic animals compared to reported crop damage. Still, some 60 per cent 
complain that wildlife causes ‘much’ or ‘very much’ damage to domestic animals. When it 
comes to the number of animals killed or injured, the reported numbers vary considerably 
within each response category. Some inconsistency may be present, but the variation may also 
reflect varying dependence on domestic animal keeping among households. 
 
4. Empirical specification and estimation results 
As already seen, three different types of households were observed in this survey. The first 
type were all households who do not participate in illegal hunting. The second and third types 
contain all households who participate in illegal hunting, the second group being all who hunt 
within the village area, while the third group all who go on hunting trips. 
 
The starting point of the empirical analysis is to analyse the household’s decision to 
participate, or not, in illegal hunting. Section 4.1 presents the empirical specification and 
estimation results of this decision problem using a Probit model. However, because some 
hunters go on hunting trips, while others hunt within the village area only, it is adequate to 
consider the households’ decision problem as one where they choose whether i) to not 
participate in hunting, to participate in hunting but ii) no hunting trips, or iii) to go on hunting 
trips. The Probit framework is therefore extended by presenting an ordered probit model, 
where the individual households are classified into three categories i)-iii). Finally, Section 4.2 
presents a model of the number of hunting trips, i.e. hunting intensity. 
 
4.1 Participation in illegal hunting and ordered groups 
  
10
 
4.1.1 Empirical specification and variable definitions 
The probit specification of the empirical model is given in equation (1)6. 
 
(1) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
0
1
i
hE   
 
 
*
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 6
_1 _ 2i i i ih CROP CROP
i i
E SRCP DISTRICT L D D
M DISTANCE u
β β β β β β
β β
= + + + + +
+ + +
 
 
Here, 1=ihE  if household i participates in illegal hunting, while 0=ihE  otherwise. The 
explanatory variables in equation (1) represent the starting point for all three empirical models 
in Section 4, but other specifications will also be presented. SRCP is a dummy for 
participation in the SRCP and takes on the value one for SRCP households and zero 
otherwise. The dummy DISTRICT is included to capture district-specific characteristics of the 
data set and equals one for Bunda households and zero for households in Serengeti. iL  is the 
number of acres cultivated for crop production by household i. iCROP _D 1  and 
i
CROP _D 2  are 
dummy variables for ‘much’ and ‘very much’ crop damage, respectively. iCROP _D 1  
( iCROP _D 2 ) takes the value one if the household reports ‘much’ damage (‘very much’ 
damage) and zero otherwise. Both categories ‘much’ and ‘very much’ are expected to 
increase the probability of hunting over the ‘no or little’ damage level. iM  is the number of 
household members. DISTANCE is the distance from the household’s village to the national 
park. Finally, iu  is the error term. 
 
Other specifications of the model will also be included. First, in order to capture the impact of 
different types of crops on the probability of participation in illegal hunting, the explanatory 
variable L will be replaced by the number of acres devoted to cotton L_COT, maize L_MAI, 
and millet L_MIL in the respective households. These crops cover some 66 per cent of the 
total amount of cultivated land in the study area. Second, two dummies are included to reflect 
                                                 
6 See Johnston and Dinardo (1997) chapter 13. 
if 0>*ihE  
 
0 otherwise 
, where 
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market availability. COT is a dummy that equals one for cotton producers and zero otherwise. 
MOT_MAI is a dummy reflecting whether some maize is produced for the market or not. It 
equals one for producers reporting that some maize is produced for sale and zero if maize is 
produced for own consumption only. Because market accessibility is expected to increase 
agricultural incomes, we tested whether the coefficients of COT and MOT_MAI are positive. 
Further, an interaction variable L_MAI*MOT_MAI is included in order to investigate whether 
the relationship between illegal hunting and maize production differs between households 
who sell maize on the market and those who do not. Millet is produced for own consumption 
only but not all its producers face a missing output market. Therefore, we interacted L_MIL 
with COT and MOT_MAI, and tested whether the relationship between illegal hunting and 
millet production differs between households who have access to the relevant markets and 
those who do not. 
 
Third, the base model excludes animal assets and damage to domestic animals in order to 
avoid a considerable reduction in the number of observations (see below). Still, because 
domestic animal keeping is widespread it is of interest to investigate the impact of this 
activity as well. The explanatory variable iY  measures the number of domestic animals in 
household i, while iANIMAL _D 1  and 
i
ANIMAL _D 2  are dummies for wildlife-induced damage 
to domestic stock. The latter are defined in the same way as the dummies for crop damage. 
Finally, instead of focusing solely on participation in the SRCP, the variables MEAT_1 and 
MEAT_2 are dummies for the amount of meat bought from the SRCP. MEAT_1 (MEAT_2) 
takes the value one if the household report ‘5 to 10’ kilo (‘more than 10’ kilo) and zero 
otherwise. Both categories are expected to have a non-positive effect on the number of 
hunting trips over the ‘0 to 5’ kilo category. Summary statistics of the variables are reported 
in Table A3.1 in Appendix 3. 
 
The Ordered Probit model can be used to model a discrete dependent variable that takes on 
ordered multi-nominal outcomes for each individual household. This applies for the three 
groups i) non-hunters, ii) hunters, but no hunting trips, and iii) hunters who go on hunting 
trips. As argued earlier, hunting in the village area seems to be less time consuming than to go 
on hunting trips in the protected area. The model is therefore expressed as7 
                                                 
7 However, if we assume that hunting in the village area and hunting in the protected area are equally time 
consuming, there is no ordering of the dependent variable. In this case, a multinominal logistic regression is used 
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(2) 
⎪⎪
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⎩
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⎧
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hE  
 
where the latent variable 
*i
hE  is defined as in equation (1) for the base model. zc  represents 
the cut-off points between successive alternatives 321 ,,z = . Here, the ordered probit natural 
ordering yields 1=ihE  for group i), 2=ihE  for group ii), and 3=ihE  for group iii). 
 
4.1.2 Estimation results 
Table 5 reports the Probit and Ordered Probit estimates for the base model as well as the 
alternative specifications. First, the coefficient of the political variable SRCP in Probit 
regression (a) is positive and significantly different from zero. This suggests that the 
probability of participation in illegal hunting is higher for SRCP households compared to 
households outside SRCP. However, this result is not stable across the different model 
specifications. On the other hand, the first three columns show that participation in hunting 
gives a significantly negative coefficient with respect to the district. That is, the probability of 
illegal hunting is higher for Serengeti households. 
 
The Probit model (a) suggests that the amount of cultivated land has no impact on the 
decision to participate in illegal hunting. When controlling for domestic animal keeping and 
the corresponding damage in model (b), the coefficient of L is negative but only significant at 
the ten per cent level of significance8. However, when distinguishing between the amounts of 
land devoted to cotton, maize and millet in model (c), the coefficient of maize is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level of significance9. Hence, the type of 
crop grown seems to affect the probability of illegal hunting. However, participation in, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
to analyse the probability of hunting in the village and probability of hunting in the protected area. The results 
are reported in Table A1.1, Appendix 1, where ‘no hunting’ is the comparison group. 
8 In model (b) the sample is reduced due to missing observations on damage to domestic animals. 
9 The coefficients of L_COT (L_MIL) are also insignificant when omitting the variables L_MIL (L_COT) and L_MAI. 
if 1cE
*i
h ≤  
 
if c1 < Ehi * ≤ c2  
 
if 32 cEc
*i
h ≤<  
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access to, markets seems to have no impact on the decision to hunt10. No other variables are 
significant in the Probit models11. 
 
 Table 5 about here 
 
The next step is to look at the ordered probit analyses of the probabilities of refraining from 
illegal hunting, to hunt illegally in the village area, or to go on hunting trips. While the district 
seems to affect the decision to participate in illegal hunting, the Ordered Probit estimation 
results in Table 5 demonstrate that this variable is less significant when we distinguish 
between the different types of hunters. 
 
For ordered Probit model (c), the probability of hunting in both the village area and the 
protected area are decreasing functions of maize production. However, and consistent with the 
Probit analysis, these probabilities seem to be independent of market accessibility. 
 
In contrast to the Probit analysis, ‘very much’ damage to crops increases both the probability 
of hunting in the village area and the probability of going on hunting trips over ‘no or very 
little’ damage 12. See model (c) Tables 5 and 6. Recall from Section 3 that the major species 
causing crop damage do not represent the targeted species for hunting. Hence, illegal hunting 
in the village area does not seem to be a way of getting rid of problem animals, but rather a 
way for the households to compensate themselves for the loss of agricultural production. 
 
                                                 
10 In model (d) the sample is reduced due to missing observations on motivation for maize production. 
11 The coefficient of DISTANCE is also insignificant when DISTRICT is omitted from the model. In addition, the 
coefficients of Y, DANIMAL_1 and DANIMAL_2 are insignificant if included in models (c)-(d). The same applies to the 
ordered probit model.  
12 As mentioned in Section 3, the survey gives information on the number of acres damaged as a percentage of the 
number of cultivated acres as well. When using an estimate of the number of acres damaged instead of damage 
impression, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. This result corresponds well with the insignificant 
coefficient of the amount of cultivated land L. As already seen, however, the types of crop produced seem to affect the 
group probabilities. Therefore, one may also expect the amount of damage to the respective crop to affect the group 
probabilities. Unfortunately, however, there is no data on damage to types of crops. Instead, the empirical models 
control for damage impressions, variables of which are subjective measures of the dimension of wildlife-induced 
damage.  
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Finally, model (c) shows that the coefficient of the number of household members is negative 
and significantly different from zero at the five per cent level of significance. This is in 
contrast with the theoretical prediction. However, this result should be interpreted with care as 
the data set contains information about the number of members in each household but, 
unfortunately, lacks information about age composition, children’s school attendance, etc. 
That is, the data set contains no accurate measure of the number of household members 
capable of working. M counts all members of the household, frequently ranging from small 
children to elders, but not the number capable of working. 
 
 Table 6 about here 
 
4.2 Hunting trips 
4.2.1 Empirical specification 
In the following, a Tobit model is used to analyse hunting intensity. For those who go on 
hunting trips, data on the number of trips and average number of days per trip was captured, 
whereas we captured no effort data for those who hunt in the village area. Instead, the 
empirical analysis of hunting intensity is related to the number of hunting trips, where this 
number equals zero for those who hunt only within the village area. Due to our inability to 
compare hunting effort of households hunting in the village area (i.e. zero trips) and non-
hunters (i.e. zero hunting effort), however, it seems difficult to apply the Tobit model to the 
whole sample. The analysis is therefore limited to the sub-sample containing only hunters. 
That is, it investigates factors determining the hunting intensity conditioned on participation 
in illegal hunting13. The Tobit model is given in (3)14 
 
(3) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
0
*i
hi
h
E
E  
 
where the latent variable 
*i
hE  is defined as in (1) for the base model. 
 
                                                 
13 A Heckman two-step model of the decision to hunt has been considered. However, all parameters were insignificant, 
which indicates that the variables cannot simultaneously determine the decision to hunt and hunting intensity. 
14 See Johnston and Dinardo (1997) chapter 13. 
if 0>ihE  
otherwise 
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4.2.2 Estimation results 
Table 7 reports the Tobit estimates. The coefficient of SRCP has a significant negative sign in 
models (a)-(d), which indicates a lower hunting intensity among hunters from SRCP villages 
compared to hunters from villages outside SRCP. Model (e) demonstrates, however, that the 
amount of meat bought from the SRCP has no impact on hunting intensity15. Instead, the 
significant negative sign of SRCP in (a)-(d) may reflect the presence of village game scouts, 
awareness building, or the establishment of village wildlife funds in the SRCP villages. The 
latter has financed investments in school and dispensary facilities and reduced the tax burden 
for the individual household. These factors may have reduced the antagonism towards wildlife 
among hunters in the SRCP villages and may therefore explain the significant negative sign of 
SRCP. 
 
The Probit analysis demonstrated that households from Serengeti are more likely to 
participate in illegal hunting than households from Bunda. The Tobit estimation results show, 
however, that the number of hunting trips is lower for hunters from Serengeti. Hence, while 
the Serengeti households are more likely to participate in hunting, hunting intensity seems to 
be higher among the Bunda hunters. 
 
Model (a) and (b) show that the amount of land cultivated for crops has no impact on the 
number of hunting trips. When distinguishing between land devoted to cotton, maize and 
millet in model (c), the coefficients of L_COT and L_MAI are negative, and significant at the 
one per cent level. In contrast, hunting intensity is an increasing function of the amount of 
land devoted to millet. This result is surprising but may be due to millet, as apposed to cotton 
and maize, being produced only for own consumption. This may indicate that increased 
production for the purpose of consumption increases hunting intensity. However, there is no 
evidence that market accessibility affects the relationship between hunting intensity, and 
millet and maize production respectively. See model (d). 
 
The theory predicts a positive impact of wildlife-induced damage on hunting intensity. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that the number of trips is significantly higher for households 
experiencing ‘very much’ damage to crops over the ‘no or little’ damage level. In addition, 
                                                 
15 This is also the case when including MEAT_1 and MEAT_2 in models (b)-(d). 
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model (b) shows that more extensive damage to domestic animals, as well as reduced animal 
stock, increases the number of hunting trips16, 17. 
 
 Table 7 about here 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Incentives to hunt illegally are detrimental to wildlife conservation in protected areas in 
developing countries. Understanding the underlying motivation for illegal hunting is crucial if 
sound advice is to be provided to policymakers who are attempting to both conserve wildlife 
and promote economic development. Despite this, little empirical attention has been paid to 
the issue. 
 
This paper estimates models of the probability of hunting illegally in general, the probability 
of hunting in the village area and in the protected area respectively, and hunting intensity 
within the group of hunters. Cross-sectional data from a household survey in western 
Serengeti, Tanzania, is used to identify factors determining the patterns of illegal hunting in 
this area. The empirical results suggest that the probability of both illegal hunting in the 
village area and in the protected area are independent of participation in the integrated 
conservation and development project in western Serengeti, namely the Serengeti Regional 
Conservation Project (SRCP). In contrast, hunting intensity is lower for hunters from SRCP 
villages. However, it is important to note that a conclusion on the impact of the establishment 
of the SRCP cannot be based on this result only, as the data set analysed here contains no time 
series. Further, even for a fixed intensity of illegal hunting, the hunting activity of the SRCP 
may have an unintended impact on wildlife conservation (see Barrett and Arcese (1998) for a 
theoretical and numerical analysis). Further investigations of the impact of the SRCP on 
illegal hunting and wildlife conservation is therefore of major importance. 
 
The analysis reveals another important relationship, namely that hunting in western Serengeti 
seems to be related to land use in agriculture. While the total amount of land has no impact on 
the probability of hunting and the number of hunting trips, some types of crops are 
detrimental to the hunting activity. Households who use a relatively large acreage for maize 
                                                 
16 The same applies if Y and DANIMAL_1 and DANIMAL_2 are included in models (c)-(e). 
17 Note, however, that a problem of causality may be present here, as households with fewer trips are able to spend 
more time protecting their land and animal assets. 
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production are less likely to hunt, both in the village area and in the protected area. Further, 
the intensity of hunting is negatively related to the amount of land cultivated for maize, as 
well as cotton. However, there is no support in this analysis for the view that the ability to sell 
food crops will reduce illegal hunting. Nonetheless, policies that stimulate increased maize 
and cotton production and reduced millet production have the potential to reduce hunting 
pressure. However, it is important to note that any agricultural expansion involving land 
clearing may have a negative impact on wildlife conservation due to reduced wildlife habitat. 
 
Wildlife imposes damage on agricultural crops, and the empirical results indicate that the 
impression of ‘very much’ damage to crops, as well as ‘much’ or ‘very much’ damage to 
domestic animals, increases hunting intensity among the hunters. These results should 
encourage policymakers to take initiatives to reduce and prevent wildlife-induced damage, 
such as encouraging fencing, chasing problem animals out of villages, and so forth. Another 
option is to compensate the local peasants for the costs of living with wildlife. There are, 
however, some obvious pitfalls to this strategy; people may overestimate the damage and a 
compensation scheme may attract people from other areas and thereby increase human 
pressure on the park borders. 
 
In summary, our empirical results show that hunting intensity is lower for hunters from SRCP 
villages. Other initiatives that may reduce illegal hunting include encouraging increased 
cotton and maize production and more extensive use of damage control. Further, such 
attempts may add more to local income than can be expected from SRCP as it works today 
(see also Barrett and Arcese (1998)). The data set shows that the average income from 
agriculture among cotton producers is some 88 000 tzh, which is more than twice that of non-
cotton producers. By comparison, records from the SRCP show that expected revenue from 
the meat-distribution program is some 2 300 tzh per household. These figures imply that the 
potential gain from the SRCP for the individual household is very limited. In order to fulfil 
the joint objective of wildlife conservation and improved welfare within local communities, 
focus should also be on agricultural policies. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Distribution of reported participation in hunting. 
                               Number                   Participation                   No participation 
Total sample                      297                         80 (27%)                                217 (73%) 
SRCP                                 148                         47 (32%)                                101 (68%) 
Not SRCP                          149                         33 (22%)                                116 (78%) 
Bunda District                   166                         36 (22%)                                130 (78%) 
Serengeti District              131                          44 (34%)                                 87 (66%) 
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Table 2: Distribution of households involved in hunting. 
                               Number                   Hunting in village area            Hunting trips 
Number                             80                         36 (45%)                                44 (55%) 
SRCP                                 47                         27 (57%)                                20 (43%) 
Not SRCP                          33                          9 (27%)                                  24 (73%) 
Bunda District                   36                          5 (14%)                                  31 (86%) 
Serengeti District              44                          31 (70%)                                 13 (30%) 
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Table 3: Number of households earning income from various activities. 
                                 Crops                   Domestic animals               Non-agriculture* 
Total sample                      220                         153                                   110 
SRCP                                 100 (68%)               58 (39%)                         66 (45%) 
Not SRCP                          120 (81%)                95 (64%)                        44 (30%) 
Bunda District**                142 (86%)                 74 (45%)                        67 (40%) 
Serengeti District**             78 (60%)                 79 (60%)                        43 (33%) 
*Non-agricultural activities do not include hunting. 
**Per cent of the number of sample households in the respective sub-group. 
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Table 4: Distribution of reported wildlife-induced damage to crops and domestic animals.  
  Response categories:                                       No               Very little     Much        Very much    Total       P* 
                                                                           damage 
                      Number of respondents               24                  18                72                180              294 
Crop              % of respondents                         8.2                 6.1               24.5             61.2             100 
damage        Mean % damage                            1.7                12.3             17.8              22.6             19.1        0.000 
                    Number of respondents                  73                 12                70                 55                210 
Damage       % of respondents                            34.8              5.7               33.3             26.2              100 
domestic      Mean pultry lost/injured                 1.2                2.7               5.5               9.4                5.1 
animals        Mean livestoc lost/injured**          0.26              2.3               2.0               3.4                1.9 
*P is the observed significance level. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for 050P .≤  
**Here ‘livestock’ includes cattle, goats, and sheep. 
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Table 5: Probit and Ordered Probit estimation results. t-values in parentheses  
   Probit 
 (a)  (b) (c)  (d) 
 Ordered probit 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
CONS -0.265 
(-0.80) 
0.271 
(0.61) 
0.129 
(0.34) 
-0.447 
(-0.76) 
    
SRCP 
 
0.388** 
(1.98) 
0.382 
(1.56) 
-0.060 
(-0.23) 
0.048 
(0.12) 
0.197 
(1.06) 
0.176 
(0.76) 
-0.277 
(-1.11) 
-0.132 
(-0.34) 
DISTRICT -0.536*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.740*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.645*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.135 
(-0.37) 
-0.224 
(-1.25) 
-0.419* 
(-1.85) 
-0.225 
(-1.00) 
0.240 
(0.70) 
L -0.015 
(-0.85) 
-0.061* 
(-1.91) 
  -0.012 
(-0.69) 
-0.058* 
(-1.81) 
  
L_COT 
 
  -0.081 
(-1.16) 
 
 
  -0.105 
(-1.49) 
 
L_MAI   -0.209*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.102 
(-1.20) 
  -0.198*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.131 
(-1.50) 
L_MIL 
 
  0.002 
(0.03) 
0.054 
(0.56) 
  0.023 
(0.40) 
0.089 
(0.96) 
COT    -0.063 
(-0.16) 
   -0.152 
(-0.42) 
MOT_MAI 
 
   0.507 
(1.10) 
   0.485 
(1.10) 
L_MAI*MOT_ 
MAI 
   -0.159 
(-1.45) 
   -0.128 
(-1.17) 
L_MIL*COT 
 
   -0.153 
(-0.80) 
   -0.187 
(-1.00) 
L_MIL* 
MOT_MAI 
 
   0.047 
(0.32) 
   0.021 
(0.15) 
Y  -0.006 
(-0.95) 
   -0.008 
(-1.26) 
  
DCROP_1 0.489* 
(1.72) 
0.244 
(0.69) 
0.361 
(1.20) 
0.389 
(0.98) 
0.456* 
(1.66) 
0.252 
(0.73) 
0.319 
(1.11) 
0.350 
(0.90) 
DCROP_2 
 
0.310 
(1.23) 
0.010 
(0.03) 
0.417 
(1.56) 
0.380 
(1.06) 
0.400* 
(1.64) 
0.108 
(0.34) 
0.514** 
(2.00) 
0.461 
(1.32) 
DANIMAL_1  0.313 
(1.29) 
   0.430* 
(1.86) 
  
DANIMAL_2  -0.106 
(-0.37) 
  
 
 0.044 
(0.16) 
  
M 
 
-0.035 
(-1.40) 
-0.014 
(-0.46) 
-0.410 
(-1.57) 
-0.049 
(-1.51) 
-0.043* 
(-1.76) 
-0.026 
(-0.83) 
-0.051** 
(-2.02) 
-0.055* 
(-1.74) 
DISTANCE -0.026 
(-1.29) 
-0.024 
(-0.97) 
0.009 
(0.35) 
0.012 
(0.32) 
-0.019 
(-1.04) 
-0.018 
(-0.79) 
0.013 
(0.59) 
0.015 
(0.41) 
Log-likelihood 
# obs. 
R2adj 
-161.555 
293 
0.056 
-107.220 
210 
0.112 
-138.526 
269 
0.130 
-94.751 
189 
0.115 
-220.101 
293 
0.030 
-146.107 
210 
0.074 
-193.736 
269 
0.082 
-126.775 
189 
0.093 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Table A3.1, Appendix 3, reports the variable definitions.  
  x/)EPr( h ∂=∂ 1  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 x/)EPr( h ∂=∂ 2  
 (a) (b) (c)  (d) 
 x/)EPr( h ∂=∂ 3  
 (a) (b)  (c)  (d) 
SRCP 
 
-0.064 
(-1.07) 
-0.053 
(-0.76) 
0.083 
(1.13)
0.036 
(0.35)
0.020 
(1.05)
0.017 
(0.76)
-0.033 
(-1.11)
-0.013 
(-0.34)
0.044 
(1.06)
0.036 
(0.76)
-0.050 
(-1.13)
-0.022 
(-0.35)
DISTRICT 0.073 
(1.25) 
0.127* 
(1.86) 
0.068 
(1.00)
-0.066 
(-0.69)
-0.023 
(-1.24)
-0.040* 
(-1.77)
-0.027 
(-1.00)
0.024 
(0.70)
-0.050 
(-1.24)
-0.087* 
(-1.81)
-0.041 
(-0.99)
0.042 
(0.68)
L 0.004 
(0.69) 
0.017* 
(1.86) 
  -0.001 
(-0.69)
-0.006* 
(-1.68)
  -0.003 
(-0.69)
-0.012* 
(-1.86)
  
L_COT 
 
  0.031 
(1.51)
   -0.012 
(-1.45)
   -0.019 
(-1.51)
 
L_MAI   0.059***
(3.94)
0.036 
(1.55)
  -0.024*** 
(-3.10)
-0.013 
(-1.43)
  -0.036***
(-3.96)
-0.022 
(-1.55)
L_MIL 
 
  -0.007 
(-0.40)
-0.024 
(-0.96)
  0.003 
(0.40)
0.009 
(0.94)
  0.004 
(0.40)
0.015 
(0.96)
COT    0.041 
(0.42)
   -0.015 
(-0.42)
   -0.025 
(-0.42)
MOT_MAI 
 
   -0.140 
(-1.05)
   0.049 
(1.11)
   0.091 
(1.00)
L_MAI*MOT_ 
MAI 
   0.035 
(1.19)
   -0.013 
(-1.14)
   -0.022 
(-1.19)
L_MIL*COT 
 
   0.051 
(1.01)
   -0.019 
(-0.98)
   -0.032 
(-1.01)
L_MIL*MOT_ 
MAI 
   -0.006 
(-0.15)
   0.002 
(0.15)
   0.004 
(0.15)
Y  0.002 
(1.28) 
   -0.008 
(-1.21)
   -0.002 
(-1.28)
  
DCROP_1 -0.158 
(-1.59) 
-0.077 
(-0.70) 
-0.101 
(-1.06)
-0.103 
(-0.84)
0.044* 
(1.77)
0.024 
(0.74)
0.037 
(1.12)
0.036 
(0.90)
0.114 
(1.50)
0.055 
(0.68)
0.064 
(1.01)
0.068 
(0.80)
DCROP_2 
 
-0.126* 
(-1.70) 
-0.032 
(-0.34) 
-0.147** 
(-2.12)
-0.117 
(-1.42)
0.041 
(1.60)
0.010 
(0.34)
0.060** 
(1.98)
0.046 
(1.33)
0.084* 
(1.71)
0.022 
(0.34)
0.087** 
(2.10)
0.072 
(1.43)
DANIMAL_1  -0.135* 
(-1.79) 
   0.040* 
(1.79)
   0.095* 
(1.72)
  
DANIMAL_2  -0.131 
(-0.16) 
   0.004 
(0.16)
   0.009 
(0.16)
  
M 
 
0.014* 
(1.77) 
0.008 
(0.83) 
0.015** 
(2.04)
0.015* 
(1.77)
-0.004* 
(-1.68)
-0.002 
(-0.81)
-0.006* 
(-1.91)
-0.006* 
(-1.64)
-0.009* 
(-1.77)
-0.005 
(-0.83)
-0.009** 
(-2.02)
-0.009* 
(-1.75)
DISTANCE 0.006 
(1.04) 
0.005 
(0.79) 
-0.004 
(-0.60)
-0.004 
(-0.41)
-0.002 
(-1.03)
-0.002 
(-0.78)
0.002 
(0.59)
0.001 
(0.41)
-0.004 
(-1.04)
-0.004 
(-0.79)
0.002** 
(0.60)
0.002 
(0.41)
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Table A3.1 in Appendix 3. 
Table 6: Marginal effects Ordered Probit model. t-values in parentheses 
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Table 7: Tobit estimation results. Dependent variable is number of hunting trips; t-values in 
parentheses  
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
CONS -2.088 
(-0.81) 
3.503* 
(1.69)
-0.847 
(-0.41)
2.551 
(1.03)
-1.942 
(-0.75) 
SRCP 
 
 -3.443** 
(-2.40) 
-2.944*** 
(-2.92) 
-5.881*** 
(-4.23) 
-5.117*** 
(-2.75) 
-6.522* 
(-1.94) 
MEAT_1 
 
    3.926 
(1.20) 
MEAT_2     1.691 
(0.46) 
DISTRICT 5.632*** 
(4.32) 
3.365*** 
(3.61) 
6.038*** 
(5.20) 
7.054*** 
(5.31) 
5.634*** 
(4.31) 
L 
 
0.023 
(0.17) 
-0.100 
(-0.58) 
  0.038 
(0.29) 
L_COT   -0.918** 
(-2.30) 
  
L_MAI   -0.927*** 
(-2.76) 
-1.934*** 
(-2.76) 
 
L_MIL 
 
  0.558** 
(2.02) 
0.411 
(1.34) 
 
COT    -4.441*** 
(-2.96) 
 
MOT_MAI 
 
   -0.202 
(-0.10) 
 
L_MAI*MOT_MAI    0.891 
(1.15) 
 
L_MIL*COT    1.066 
(1.09) 
 
L_MIL*MOT_MAI    0.030 
(0.04) 
 
Y 
 
 -0.137*** 
(-2.80) 
   
DCROP_1 3.036 
(1.26) 
1.806 
(0.99) 
2.771 
(1.53) 
1.776 
(0.88) 
2.840 
(1.18) 
DCROP_2 
 
4.837** 
(2.11) 
3.902** 
(2.37) 
4.875*** 
(2.78) 
3.678* 
(1.94) 
4.811** 
(2.11) 
DANIMAL_1  4.272*** 
(4.33) 
   
DANIMAL_2 
 
 4.572*** 
(3.76) 
   
M 
 
-0.087 
(-0.43) 
-0.337 
(-2.07) 
-0.100 
(-0.71) 
-0.147 
(-1.05) 
-0.094 
(0.47) 
DISTANCE -0.126 
(-0.97) 
-0.209** 
(-2.20) 
0.108 
(0.92) 
0.081 
(0.55) 
-0.153 
(-1.17) 
Log-likelihood 
# obs. 
R2adj 
-145.692 
80 
0.132
-83.999 
55 
0.289
-119.530 
75 
0.198
-71.979 
48 
0.278
-144.480 
80 
0.139 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Table A3.1, Appendix 3, reports the variable definitions.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1.1: Multinominal Logit estimation results. t-values in parentheses.  
   Village area 
 (a)  (b) (c)  (d) 
 Protected area 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
CONS -1.585** 
(-1.94) 
-1.195 
(-1.03) 
-1.045 
(-1.10) 
-2.178* 
(-1.64) 
-1.769** 
(-2.12) 
-0.750 
(-0.68) 
-1.234 
(-1.37) 
-2.389 
(-1.449 
SRCP 
 
1.727*** 
(3.59) 
2.370*** 
(3.29) 
1.328** 
(1.95) 
1.232 
(1.39) 
-0.133 
(-0.29) 
-0.311 
(-0.56) 
-0.947* 
(-1.65) 
-0.853 
(-0.88) 
DISTRICT -3.093*** 
(-5.19) 
-5.333*** 
(-4.20) 
-3.403***
(-4.80) 
-3.043***
(-2.68) 
0.519 
(1.14) 
0.288 
(0.53) 
0.576 
(1.04) 
1.808** 
(2.06) 
L -0.047 
(-0.94) 
-0.095* 
(-1.22) 
  -0.018 
(-0.41) 
-0.144* 
(-1.77) 
  
L_COT 
 
  -0.028 
(-0.17) 
 
 
  -0.237 
(-1.45) 
 
L_MAI   -0.219* 
(-1.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.03) 
  -0.380*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.597* 
(-1.92) 
L_MIL 
 
  -0.084 
(-0.61) 
-0.008 
(-0.03) 
  0.101 
(0.73) 
0.367 
(1.49) 
COT    0.310 
(0.29) 
   -0.445 
(-0.55) 
MOT_MAI 
 
   0.617 
(0.62) 
   0.664 
(0.63) 
L_MAI*MOT_ 
MAI 
   -0.259 
(-1.08) 
   0.159 
(0.45) 
L_MIL*COT 
 
   -0.024 
(-0.04) 
   -0.466 
(-1.13) 
L_MIL* 
MOT_MAI 
 
   0.070 
(0.21) 
   -0.159 
(-0.47) 
Y  0.003 
(0.17) 
   -0.035* 
(-1.81) 
  
DCROP_1 1.136 
(1.60) 
1.360 
(1.29) 
1.091 
(1.44) 
1.258 
(1.32) 
0.922 
(1.31) 
0.762 
(0.84) 
0.625 
(0.85) 
1.088 
(0.90) 
DCROP_2 
 
-0.231 
(-0.38) 
-0.713 
(-0.78) 
-0.073 
(-0.11) 
0.140 
(0.17) 
1.208* 
(1.86) 
0.999 
(1.12) 
1.460** 
(2.17) 
1.658 
(1.48) 
DANIMAL_1  -0.655 
(-0.90) 
   1.197** 
(2.26) 
  
DANIMAL_2  -1.888** 
(-2.01) 
  
 
 0.715 
(1.08) 
  
M 
 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.064 
(0.66) 
-0.014 
(-0.20) 
-0.083 
(-0.93) 
-0.108** 
(-1.94) 
-0.080 
(-1.17) 
-0.119** 
(-1.97) 
-0.106* 
(-1.43) 
DISTANCE -0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.007 
(-0.11) 
0.012 
(0.24) 
0.050 
(0.59) 
-0.032 
(-0.67) 
-0.028 
(-0.49) 
0.032 
(0.56) 
0.052 
(0.57) 
Log-likelihood 
# obs. 
R2adj 
-191.366 
293 
0.156 
-115.387 
210 
0.269 
-166.625 
269 
0.210 
-110.238 
189 
0.211 
-191.366 
293 
0.156 
-115.387 
210 
0.269 
-166.625 
269 
0.210 
-110.238 
189 
0.211 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Table A3.1, Appendix 3, reports the variable definitions.  
Appendix 2: The survey  
During the period of June-August 2001 I conducted interviews in 297 households in Serengeti 
and Bunda Districts. In order to capture the human-wildlife interface, six villages located 
along the western border of the Serengeti National Park were selected for participation in the 
survey. Four of these villages participate in SRCP. The households were picked at random 
from complete lists of names, and the number of households from each village was 
determined by weighting the villages by their respective size. Each village in the area is 
divided into several sub-villages. In order to reflect the distribution of households over the 
village area, each sub-village was weighted by their respective number of households. In each 
household, whenever possible, the head of the household was interviewed. The interviews 
were conducted in Kiswahili with translation assistance from two local Tanzanians.  
 
Based on experience from test interviews in Bunda, a strategy was developed on how to go 
about with the questionnaire in general and especially the sensitive questions on illegal 
hunting. In order to gain confidence from the local people, we also spent much time in the 
villages and had two inhabitants in each village to visit the households in advance in order to 
explain the purpose of the survey. The interviews took place in the home of the respective 
household.   
 
Some caveats should be made as the data set have a few weaknesses that are common for 
questionnaires. First, information on income is likely to be understated because some 
respondents are suspicious and fear that the information will be handed over to the district and 
central government for taxation purposes. Second, the quantitative data on plot size under 
various agricultural uses are given by the respondents’ subjective estimate, which may be 
subject to errors. The same applies to the estimated wildlife-induced damage to crops and 
livestock. The reader should be aware of these problems when reading the paper.  
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Appendix 3: Tables 
Table A3.1: Description of variables and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Description N Mean 
(st. dev.) 
Min Max 
SRCP =1 if household lives in a SRCP 
village, =0 otherwise 
297 0.5 
(0.5) 
0 1 
MEAT_1 =1 if 5-10 kilo meat is bought from 
SRCP, =0 otherwise 
296 0.27 
(0.45) 
0 1 
MEAT_2 =1 if >10 kilo meat is bought from 
SRCP, =0 otherwise 
296 0.13 
(0.33) 
0 1 
DISTRICT =1 if household lives in Bunda, =0 if 
household lives in Serengeti 
297 0.56 
(0.5) 
0 1 
L Acre cultivated land  
 
297 7.387 
(6.409) 
0 55 
L_COT Acre cotton production 275 1.271 
(2.234) 
0 20 
L_MAI 
 
Acre maize production 273 2.615 
(4.524) 
0 50 
L_MIL 
 
Acre millet production 275 1.364 
(1.725)  
0 11 
COT =1 if household produces cotton, =0 
otherwise 
273 0.47 
(0.50) 
0 1 
MOT_MAI 
 
=1 if maize is produced for cons. and 
market, =0 if maize is produced for cons. 
only 
191 0.36 
(0.48) 
 
0 1 
L_MAI*MOT_MAI Interaction term acre and motive maize 
production 
192 1.91 
(4.69) 
0 50 
L_MIL*COT Interaction term acre millet and cotton 
production 
275 0.57 
(1.15) 
0 10 
L_MIL*MOT_MAI Interaction term acre millet and motive 
maize production 
210 0.45 
(1.16) 
0 11 
Y Number of domestic animals 277 20.23 
(26.12) 
0 150 
DCROP_1 =1 if household report much crop 
damage, =0 otherwise 
294 0.24 
(0.43) 
0 1 
DCROP_2 =1 if household report very much crop 
damage, =0 otherwise 
294 0.61 
(0.49) 
0 1 
DANIMAL_1 =1 if household reports much damage to 
domestic animals,  
=0 otherwise 
229 0.33 
(0.47) 
0 1 
DANIMAL_2 =1 if household reports very much 
damage to domestic animals,  
=0 otherwise 
229 0.27 
(0.44) 
0 1 
M Number of household members 296 7.14 
(4.54) 
1 38 
DISTANCE Distance from the village to the national 
park (km) 
297 8.38 
(5.07) 
2 17 
 
